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Technological progress has long been posited to be crucial in a country’s economic
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nomic growth. The global game established by Morris and Shin(2000) is extended
to a two-sector Overlapping Generation model where capital goods can be produced
by two diﬀerent technologies. The ﬁrst is a conventional technology with constant re-
turns, which are perfectly revealed to economic agents. The second is a new technology
exhibiting increasing return to scale due to technological externalities, whose returns
economic agents only have incomplete information about. Economic agents have to
choose which technology to invest. My model reveals that under certain circumstances
coordination failure in the capital good sector will occur and be manifested as the
under-investment in the new technology. In this way, I explain how coordination fail-
ure in a country’s technology updating process leads to slower capital accumulation
and economic growth. More interestingly, the model generates a positive correlation
between economic growth and volatility through a new channel associated with coor-
dination failure. Policy implications are discussed as well.
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11 Introduction
Technological progress has long been posited to play a key role in economic growth
by economists such as Schumpeter dating back to the 1950’s. In the 1990’s, Romer,
Aghion, Howitt, as well as others, formalized this idea by introducing it into the
mainstream neoclassical growth models and establishing the so-called endogenous
growth theory.
Despite the importance of technological progress in economic growth, it is a topic
diﬃcult for formal economic modeling. As Dowrick (1995) summarizes, new technol-
ogy in general exhibits three characteristics which distinguish it from other ordinary
goods: ﬁrst, new technology contains great uncertainty due to its new and unknown
nature. Second, technological externalities exist, leading to investment complemen-
tarities in new technology investment. Third, information asymmetry exists. Pro-
ducers of new products have more information than their creditors or users. All these
characteristics are diﬃcult to be modeled by standard economic tools.
Global games, ﬁrst studied by Carlsson and van Damme (1993), turn out to be
a useful tool for the study of new technology. Global games model the situations
where both uncertainty and strategic complementarities are present. By doing so,
they capture two main characteristics in new technology investment: uncertainty
and technological externalities. Hence, global games allow us to formally model new
technology investment with these two features to gain valuable insights and policy
implications.
This paper introduces new technology investment modeled by global games into
an Overlapping Generation economy with two sectors: the consumption goods sector
and capital goods sector. While consumption goods are assumed to be produced by
an exogenously given time-invariant technology, I assume that capital goods can be
produced by two diﬀerent technologies in each period. The ﬁrst is a conventional one
with constant returns that are perfectly revealed to economic agents. The other is a
new one exhibiting increasing returns to scale due to technological externalities. In
addition, economic agents have only incomplete information about the returns of the
new technology due to its unknown nature. The returns of the new technology in
2each period are determined by two parts: the ﬁrst part is a technology shock, which
is random and i.i.d over time. This part is called economic fundamental, because it
purely depends on the nature of the technology. The second part is the proportion of
economic agents investing in the new technology. The returns are higher with a larger
proportion of ﬁrms investing. Thus, the second part introduces investment comple-
mentarities due to technological externalities. Furthermore, economic agents only
have incomplete information about the economic fundamental of the new technology.
More speciﬁcally, they have a prior belief and receive a noisy private signal about
the technology shock before they make their investment decisions. This assumption
captures the feature of uncertainty in new technology investment.
The above assumptions are a simple way to model technological progress in an
economy. I focus on technological progress in the capital goods sector, because it
has more scope for technological innovation than the consumption goods sector. By
assuming that in each period capital goods can be produced by both conventional and
new technologies, I model the dynamic technological updating process in a simpliﬁed
way. By assuming that the new technology exhibits externalities and uncertainty,
I capture the two main features of a new technology. Technological externalities
play an important role in the endogenous growth theory. The theoretical literature
emphasizing technological externalities and their implications to economic growth
includes Romer (1990), Dowrick (1995), and Aghion and Howitt (1998). Meanwhile,
empirical work studying technological externalities is abundant. As Dowrick (1995)
surveys, this work reinforces the prevalent view that technological externalities are
signiﬁcant. Moreover, the huge uncertainty in new technology investment is self-
evident due to its new and unknown nature: the whole process from inventing a new
technology to putting it into production is long and unpredictable.
This paper does not intend to model the mechanism through which technological
externalities originate. Instead, I use the reduced form to assume their existence,
and focus on the implications that they have to capital accumulation and economic
growth. Due to technological externalities, economic agents face two kinds of un-
certainties about the returns of new technology investment: ﬁrst, they have incom-
plete information about the technology shock; second, they are uncertain about the
3actions of other agents. My model reveals that the two uncertainties will lead to
ineﬃciency in equilibrium. Coordination failure can occur, which is manifested as
under-investment in the new technology. In such a framework, I study when and how
coordination failure leads to slower capital accumulation and economic growth. More
interestingly, the model generates a positive correlation between economic growth and
volatility through a very peculiar mechanism associated with coordination failure. In
my model, more investment in the new technology can alleviate coordination failure
and lead to higher economic growth. Meanwhile, the new technology is risker by
nature and more investment on it leads to more volatility as well. Policy implications
are examined as well.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 gives a survey on related
literature. A two-sector Overlapping Generation model is established in Section 3
and its equilibrium is characterized. Section 4 analyzes when and how coordination
failure leads to slower economic growth. The relationship between economic volatility
and growth is also examined. Numerical simulation is given in Section 5. Section 6
explores policy implications, followed by conclusions in Section 7.
2 Literature Survey
This paper is related to three strands of economic literature. The ﬁrst strand is
on global games and their applications to macroeconomics. The second strand is
on traditional coordination games with perfect information and their applications
to macroeconomics. The third strand is on the endogenous growth theory, which
emphasizes the importance of technological progress in economic growth.
Global games were ﬁrst introduced by Carlsson and van Damme (1993). They
incorporate incomplete information into a traditional coordination game with perfect
information. In the game each player observes his payoﬀs with some noise. By
iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies, they prove that when the noise
gets inﬁnitely small, there is a unique equilibrium in the game.
Morris and Shin (1998) study currency attacks in a global game setup. They ﬁnd
that when speculators need to coordinate their actions to successfully attack a ﬁxed
4exchange rate regime, and meanwhile are only able to observe economic fundamentals
with some small noise, there is a unique equilibrium in the game, determined by both
economic fundamentals and the beliefs of speculators. This result diﬀers from that of
a traditional coordination game with perfect information, where a currency attack is
solely determined by the self-fulﬁlling beliefs of speculators. Successfully overcoming
the problem of indeterminacy of multiple equilibria models, their model allows for
the analysis of policy implications.
Morris and Shin (2000) summarize the applications of global games in macroeco-
nomic modeling by explaining how global games can be used in the context of bank
runs, currency crises, and debt pricing. They argue that global games are a useful
approach for the analysis of many macroeconomic issues where players’ payoﬀs are
interdependent. They reckon that global games provide a more solid ground for policy
analysis than multiple equilibria models due to their property of unique equilibrium.
How public information inﬂuences equilibrium allocation and social welfare in
economies with investment complementarities is studied by Angeletos and Pavan
(2004). They demonstrate that when coordination is socially desirable, an increase in
the precision of public information will always increase social welfare, given that the
complementarities are weak so that the equilibrium is unique. When the complemen-
tarities are strong, however, so that multiple equilibria are possible, the increase in
public information may facilitate the coordination on both “bad” and “good” equi-
libria.
Finally, Chamley (2004) gives a survey on coordination games and global games.
A detailed summary about the theory and applications of global games is also given
by Morris and Shin (2003).
The second strand of literature is on macroeconomic complementarities and their
implications for the economy. Bryant (1983) uses a special form of production func-
tion to study how technological complementarities generate Pareto-ranked multiple
equilibria. The business cycle implications of technology complementarities is ex-
plored by Baxter and King (1991) in a model whose structure is similar to a standard
real business cycle model. In their quantitative work, business cycles are generated
by a demand shock and propagated through technological complementarities is quan-
5titatively modeled.
Diamond (1982) studies how trading externalities cause ”thick market” eﬀects in
the presence of trading frictions. He ﬁnds that the return of an individual economic
agent will be higher due to reduced search costs if more agents are in the market
searching for trading partners.
Cooper (1999) comprehensively surveys macroeconomic complementarities and
their implications for macroeconomic behavior. He examines a variety of sources of
macroeconomic complementarities, such as technological complementarities, demand
spillover eﬀects and trading externalities, and studies their implications.
The third strand of literature is about endogenous economic growth. This litera-
ture combines the idea of Schumpeter (1950) that technological progress is crucial in
economic growth with standard neoclassical growth models, and studies how techno-
logical progress inﬂuences a country’s economic growth and consequently its policy
implications.
Romer (1990) emphasizes the importance of non-rivalry of technology as a main
source both of growth and of potential market failure. He argues that the non-rivalry
feature of a technology and the consequent increasing returns to scale in the sector
that uses the technology make long-run growth possible. Meanwhile, due to non-
rivalry of technology, private motives for investing in new technology are usually
sub-optimal. Thus an important policy implication is that governments should take
steps to stimulate more new technology investment.
Aghion and Howitt (1998) provides a comprehensive survey on the endogenous
growth theory literature. They examine how technological progress, inﬂuenced by a
variety of factors such as organizations, institutions, market structure, market im-




The framework of this model follows the two-sector Overlapping Generation model
established by Ennis and Keister (2003), who explore the impact of bank runs on cap-
ital stock and output. As in their model, I assume that the consumption goods sector
exhibits constant capital returns. My model diﬀers from theirs in the capital goods
sector, where a global game is applied to the study of new technology investment.
This is a standard overlapping generation model with inﬁnite time horizon, where
each generation lives for two periods. There is also an initial old generation endowed
with capital k0 at the beginning of time.
At the beginning of each period t, a new generation of a continuum of agents with
mass 1, denoted by generation t, is born. Each agent is endowed with 1 unit of labor
when young, and nothing when old. Labor is supplied inelastically.
Capital goods are produced as follows. At the end of time t, young agents of
generation t with wage income can choose from two ways of investing to produce
capital goods. One is to invest in a conventional technology, which transforms 1 unit
of consumption goods at the end of time t into Rc
t = r units of capital goods at the
beginning of time t+1. Here r is an exogenously given constant. The other is to invest
in a new technology. The return on the new technology, Rn
t , is determined by two
factors: the technology shock denoted by θt (also called the economic fundamental of
the technology) and the proportion of the agents who invest in the new technology,
1−λt. So λt is the proportion of the agents who invest in the conventional technology.
If a young agent invests one unit of the consumption goods in the new technology at
the end of time t, he will get Rn
t = eθt−λt units of capital at the beginning of time
t + 1.
The technology shock θt is i.i.d over time and is normally distributed with mean
¯ θ and precision α.
In period t, after θt is realized, it is observed with noise by the young agents. In
7particular, each young agent observes his own private signal
xit = θt + εit,
where εit is normally distributed with mean 0 and precision β. It is assumed that
{εit} is i.i.d over agents.
Consumption goods are produced as follows. At the beginning of time t + 1,
old agents of generation t rent their capital produced from the investment at the
end of time t to a continuum of perfectly competitive ﬁrms. These ﬁrms produce a
single consumption good in the economy, using labor and capital according to the
production function







where ¯ Kt is the average capital-labor ratio in the economy at time t. The depreciation
rate of capital is assumed to be 1 (In this paper I use capital and small letters to
denote variables at aggregate and individual levels respectively).
The utility function for each agent born at period t is given by
ut = βlog(c2,t), (2)
where c2,t denotes the consumption of an old agent born at period t, and log represents
natural logarithm function. So we can see that an agent will consume nothing when
young and consume all he has when old. Figure 1 gives the timing of the model.
3.2 Market Equilibrium
This section characterizes the market equilibrium in this model.
3.2.1 Consumption Goods Market Equilibrium
The consumption goods market is perfectly competitive. Equilibrium labor supply is
given by Lt = 1, since labor is supplied inelastically. Also in equilibrium ¯ Kt = Kt.








Young agents of generation t with wage income      
decide which technoogy to invest in to produce      
capital goods.                                     
Old agents of generation t−1 consume all they have 
and die.                                           
Old agents of generation t provide capital
produced from their investment and hire   
labor to produce consumption goods.      
Young agents of generation t+1 are born   
and provide labor to earn wage income.    
                                          
Young agents of generation t are born          
and provide labor to earn wage income.         
Old agents of generation t−1 provide           
capital and hire labor to produce consumption  
goods.                                         
Figure 1: The timeline
wt = (1 − µ)Kt.
Notice that here I follow the assumption of AK models that capital has constant
returns. This assumption will greatly simplify the analysis.
3.2.2 Capital Goods Market Equilibrium
In each period t, after observing his own private signal xit, a young agent with wage
wt has to decide to invest in the conventional or new technology at the end of period
t.
Given such a setup, I can prove that there is a unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium
in this game. In equilibrium, each agent will invest in the new technology if and only
if his private signal xit is greater than a threshold level. Otherwise, he will invest in
the conventional technology.
After observing the private signal xit, agent it updates his belief about θt according
to Bayes’ rule. Since both θt and xit are normally distributed, (θt|xit) is also normally
distributed.
9Moreover, the mean of (θt|xit) is
ρit =
α¯ θ + βxit
α + β
. (3)






Proposition 1. Provided that γ ≤ 2π, there is a unique symmetric trigger strategy
equilibrium in the capitals good market in each period. In this equilibrium, each young






∗ − ¯ θ)) = log(r).
Otherwise, the young agent chooses to invest in the conventional technology.
Proof:
Here I conﬁne attention to symmetric trigger strategy equilibria and prove that
there is such a unique equilibrium. In the appendix, I prove that this symmetric
trigger strategy equilibrium is the unique equilibrium that survives the iterated elim-
ination of strictly dominated strategies.
Given that attention is conﬁned only to symmetric trigger strategy equilibrium,
it takes two steps to prove that there is such a unique equilibrium. First, the unique
threshold level ρ∗ is pinpointed, given the hypothesis that each young agent follows the
strategy of investing in the new technology if and only if his updated belief ρit > ρ∗.
Second, it is proved that this strategy is optimal for every agent.
For ρ∗ to be an equilibrium triggering point, a young agent with the updated belief
ρ∗ must be indiﬀerent between investing in the new technology and a conventional
one.
Suppose an agent is at the equilibrium triggering point. I will abuse the notation
and denote him by ρ∗, his updated belief about the mean of the return from the new
technology investment. Then each agent it is assumed to invest in the new technology
if and only if ρit > ρ∗.
10We know that the expected utility of agent ρ∗ from investing 1 unit of consumption
goods in the new technology is given by
E[log(e
θt−λtµ|x
∗)] = E(θt − λt|x
∗) + log(µ).
Recall that the relationship between x∗ and ρ∗ is given by Equation (3).




Now I need to ﬁnd E(λt|x∗). Given the equilibrium strategy that each ﬁrm it will
invest in the new technology if and only if ρit > ρ∗,
E(λt|x





∗) = Prob(ρjt < ρ
∗|x
∗).
From Equation (3), we know that
ρjt =











∗ − ¯ θ)|x
∗). (5)
We know that (xjt|x∗) = (θ + εjt|x∗) is normally distributed with mean ρ∗ and
variance 1
α+β + 1



















∗ − ¯ θ)), (7)








∗ − ¯ θ)). (8)
The utility of agent ρ∗ from investing in the conventional technology is given by
log(rµ).
Since at the triggering point the agent has to be indiﬀerent between investing in





∗ − ¯ θ)) = log(r).
Given γ < 2π, ρ∗ −Φ(
√
γ(ρ∗ − ¯ θ)) is strictly increasing in ρ∗. So there is a unique
solution of ρ∗ satisfying the above equation.
Now I need to show that, given ρ∗, the strategy that an agent it will invest in the
new technology if and only if ρit > ρ∗ is optimal for every agent.
For agent it with ρit > ρ∗,
E(θt − λt|xit) = ρit − Φ(
√
γ(ρ




∗ − ρit))). (9)
And its precision is α + β.
Agent it will invest in the new technology , because
E(θt − λt|xit) − log(r) = ρit − Φ(
√
γ(ρ




∗ − ρit))) − log(r) > 0. (10)
The reason that the above function is positive is that it is strictly increasing in
ρit, and when ρit = ρ∗, it is equal to 0 by construction. It is easy to show that its















∗ − ρit))) > 0.
Similarly, I conclude that an agent it with ρit < ρ∗ will invest in the conventional
technology, because E(θt − λt|xit) − log(r) < 0. Note that equilibrium strategy ρ∗ is
time invariant.
Q.E.D
123.2.3 Law of Motion of the Capital
The law of motion of the capital is given as follows:








The consumption proﬁle of a typical generation t is:
c1,t = 0; (12)
c2,t =
(
(1 − µ)ktrµ λt of agents investing in conventional technology
(1 − µ)kteθt−λtµ 1 − λt of agents investing in new technology
(13)
The initial old generation has the consumption proﬁle {c2,0 = µk0}.
4 An Analytical Study on the Model
This section applies the above model to the study of how incomplete information
and coordination failure inﬂuence new technology investment, economic growth, and
volatility.
4.1 Coordination Failure and Economic Growth
First, let us look at the case where economic agents have perfect information about
θt. When θt < log(r), no agent will invest in the new technology and it is the ﬁrst
best solution. When θt > 1 + log(r), every agent will invest in the new technology
and it is also the ﬁrst best solution. The interesting case is log(r) < θt < 1 + log(r).
With perfect information, this case has two (stable) equilibria: one is that all the
agents invest in the conventional technology; the other is that all the agents invest
in the new technology. The latter equilibrium is Pareto superior to the former one.
13Thus, under perfect information, coordination failure is manifested as the randomness
about which equilibrium is realized.
In my model, I ﬁnd that given γ < 2π, there is always a unique equilibrium
due to the introduction of incomplete information. Moreover, I ﬁnd that the ﬁrst
best solution under perfect information can never be achieved in this equilibrium.
The ineﬃciency in equilibrium is caused by two kinds of uncertainties: one is the
uncertainty about θt, the economic fundamentals of the new technology; the other is
the uncertainty about the actions of other agents.
A special case with β → ∞ can analytically reveal how the uncertainty about
the actions of other agents leads to an ineﬃcient equilibrium outcome. We know
that β → ∞ means that the private signal of agents almost perfectly reveals the new
technology shock. That is, the ﬁrst kind of uncertainty is vanishingly small. I ﬁnd
that this assumption cannot eliminate the uncertainty about other agents’ actions,
and the ﬁrst best equilibrium with perfect information cannot be achieved due to
coordination failure among economic agents.
When β → ∞, γ, which is strictly decreasing in β, goes to zero. In addition,
ρ∗ =
α¯ θ+βx∗



















The intuition for this result is that when β → ∞, each agent believes that his
private signal x is exactly the true value of θ so that there is always half of the agents
receiving private signals below his, and half of the agents receiving private signals
above his.
Now let us examine economic growth, i.e, how outputs Y grow over time. Note
that due to the speciﬁc production function in the model, Y = K in each period.
We know that
Kt+1 = (1 − µ)Kt[λtr + (1 − λt)e
θt−λt].
14So the ex ante expected average gross capital (economic) growth rate is given by
g = E(Yt+1/Yt) = E(Kt+1/Kt) = (1 − µ)E[λtr + (1 − λt)e
θt−λt].





So λt = 1 when θt < log(r) + 1
2 since
√
β(x∗ − θt) goes to +∞ in this case, and
λt = 0 when θt > log(r) + 1
2 since
√
β(x∗ − θt) goes to −∞ in this case.
The ex ante expected gross economic growth rate is given by:












α(θt − ¯ θ))].
It is the expected value of Kt+1/Kt, given that each period the agents take the
equilibrium strategy described above, and that θt is normally distributed with mean
¯ θ and precision α. Note that in this inﬁnite time horizon model, the actual average
gross economic growth rate will converge to the expected average gross economic
growth rate when time goes to inﬁnity.
Assume that the Pareto superior equilibrium with perfect information is always
realized, that is, the agents will all invest in the new technology when θt > log(r)
and all invest in the conventional technology when θt < log(r). The ex ante expected
average gross economic growth rate is then given by:
g
FB = (1 − µ)[rΦ(
√






α(θt − ¯ θ))].
It is the expected value of Kt+1/Kt given the Pareto superior equilibrium is realized
each period and θt is normally distributed with mean ¯ θ and precision α.
We get the above equation because it is optimal for all the agents to invest in
the conventional technology if θt < log(r) and to invest in the new technology if
θt > log(r).
It is obvious to see that gFB − g > 0 and
g









α(θt − ¯ θ))dθt.
15The above function indicates that coordination failure will most severely dampen
economic growth when ¯ θ is around the range [log(r),log(r) + 1
2]. When ¯ θ is in this
range, φ(
√
α(θt − ¯ θ)) is at its highest values given θt ∈ [log(r),log(r)+ 1
2]. Therefore,
gFB − g will be higher, indicating more losses from coordination failure.
The policy implication from this result is that when the new technology returns
of an economy fall into the range that is close to that of the conventional technology
returns, coordination failure turns to be most severe, and the economy should beneﬁt
more from encouraging more investment in the new technology.
Note that this solution is Pareto optimal not only because it maximizes the eco-
nomic growth rate, but also because it maximizes the ex ante expected utility of an
agent, which is given by:










It is obvious that this expected utility function is maximized when x∗ = log(r).
4.2 Implications for Economic Volatility
This model can also be used to study economic volatility and its relationship with
economic growth. In this model, economic volatility originates from two kinds of
uncertainties. One uncertainty is about the economic fundamentals of the new tech-
nology. This uncertainty is exogenously given. The other uncertainty is about the
actions of other economic agents. This uncertainty is endogenously generated in an
economy where investment complementarities exist, but coordination is not available.











From the above expression, we can see that θt, the economic fundamentals of the
new technology, represents the ﬁrst kind of uncertainty. The proportion of agents not
investing, λt, represents the second kind of uncertainty.
16It is diﬃcult to derive an analytical expression for the volatility. But the later
numerical simulation shows that the economy is most stable when ¯ θ < log(r). The
economy is moderately volatile when ¯ θ ∈ [log(r),log(r) + 1], which I call the coordi-
nation zone. Finally, the economy is most volatile when ¯ θ > log(r)+1. So in general
the relationship between economic growth and volatility is positive with the increase
in ¯ θ. A detailed examination will be given in Section 5.3.
Another interesting result generated by this model is that economic agents’ risk
attitude will inﬂuence their choices between two technologies, leading to a positive
correlation between economic growth and volatility that is associated with coordina-
tion failure. The main diﬀerence between the conventional technology and the new
one is that the returns of the former are constant, while the returns of the latter are
uncertain. As mentioned before, the uncertainty embedded in the new technology
investment is twofold: ﬁrst, it stems from the uncertainty about economic fundamen-
tals, θt. Second, it stems from the uncertainty about other agents’ beliefs about θt
and their actions based on their beliefs.
My model reveals that the less risk-averse attitude of economic agents can alleviate
coordination failure. The intuition is simple: the main consequence of coordination
failure is under-investment in the new technology. Since the returns of the new
technology are volatile and those of the conventional technology are constant, the
less risk-averse attitude will encourage more investment in the new technology, and
therefore overcome coordination failure.
Note when an economic agent, say it, decides which technology to choose, his
expected utility from investing in the new technology is given by
uit = EU(e
θt−λtµwt|xit),
where E(λt|xit) = Φ(
√
γ(ρ∗ − ¯ θ)).
It is obvious to see that utility function forms will inﬂuence economic agents’
expected utility derived from the new technology investment. According to Jensen’s
inequality, a risk neutral agent will more tend to invest in the new technology than
a risk averse agent. That is, x∗, the threshold level of private signal above which
economic agents will invest in the new technology, is lower for a risk neutral agent than
17for a risk averse agent. In this way, the less risk-averse attitude of economic agents
helps alleviate the coordination failure problem and leads to higher economic growth.
Meanwhile, the new technology is more volatile by nature and more investment in
the new technology leads to higher economic volatility as well. This mechanism will
be most signiﬁcant when the returns of the new technology are in the coordination
failure zone.
In general, my model generates a positive relationship between economic growth
and volatility. It is no surprise because the fundamental idea of this model is that
economic growth comes from new technology investment, which is volatile by na-
ture. Therefore, the pursuit of higher economic growth is consequently companied by
higher economic volatility. Empirical evidence in general ﬁnds a negative relationship
between economic growth and volatility (Hnatkovska and Loayza (2005)). However,
this negative relationship is caused mostly by factors such as institutional and ﬁnan-
cial development, and ﬁscal policies, which are missing in my model. Moreover, the
negative relationship can be caused by the causal eﬀect of volatility on growth, which
is not addressed in my model either. Empirical testing does ﬁnd a positive relation-
ship between economic growth and volatility (Hnatkovska and Loayza (2005)) among
industrious countries, where the factors mentioned above are insigniﬁcant.
5 A Numerical Study on the Model
This section gives some numerical examples based on my model. These examples will
help explain my model more clearly.
5.1 Economic Growth Paths with Diﬀerent Levels of ¯ θ
Suppose that the capital share of income µ = 0.4. The new technology shock θ ∼
N(¯ θ,1/10) (α = 10) and the precision of the agents’ private signal β = 20. Note that
γ = 3 < 2π such that the condition for a unique equilibrium is held. I also assume
r = 1.7. Three diﬀerent levels of ¯ θ are given: 0, 1.0 and 1.6. Note that log(r) = 0.53,
and log(r) + 1 = 1.53. So ¯ θ = 0 < log(r) = 0.53, ¯ θ = 1.0 ∈ [log(r),log(r) + 1], and
18¯ θ = 1.6 > log(r) + 1 = 1.53.
Given the parameter values above, I can calculate the equilibrium ρ∗, time series
of the proportion of agents investing in the conventional technology λt, and time
series of natural logarithm of capital stock (output), log(Kt) (log(Yt)). Each example
is simulated for 50 periods. The results are as follows.
It turns out that ρ∗ is equal to 0.5675, 1.0981 and 1.5265 respectively, given that ¯ θ
takes the values of 1.6, 1.0 and 0. The following ﬁgures give the time series of realized
θt, λt, and natural logarithm of capital stock (output) log(Kt) (log(Yt)), given that ¯ θ
is equal to 0, 1 and 1.6.
195.1.1 The Case of ¯ θ = 0











Figure 2: Time series of realized θ when ¯ θ = 0





























f l when ¯ θ = 0




























Figure 4: Time series of logK (logY ) when ¯ θ = 0
5.1.2 The Case of ¯ θ = 1.0












Figure 5: Time series of realized θ when ¯ θ = 1














Figure 6: Time series of l when ¯ θ = 1














































f logK (logY ) when ¯ θ = 1
5.1.3 The Case of ¯ θ = 1.6













Figure 8: Time series of realized θ when ¯ θ = 1.6































f l when ¯ θ = 1.6
The ﬁgures above clearly reveal that coordination failure is closely related to the
relative return levels between the conventional technology and new technology.
When ¯ θ < log(r), θt < log(r) most of the time. We know that the ﬁrst best solu-
























Figure 10: Time series of logK (logY ) when ¯ θ = 1.6
tion when θt < log(r) is to invest in the conventional technology, and in equilibrium,
λt is actually equal to 1 most of the time. Similarly, when ¯ θ > log(r)+1, θt > log(r)
most of the time. We know that the ﬁrst best solution when θt < log(r) is to invest
in the new technology, and in equilibrium, λt is actually equal to 0 most of the time.
However, when log(r) < ¯ θ < log(r)+1, log(r) < θt < log(r)+1 most of the time. In
this case coordination failure becomes severe. The ﬁrst best solution in this case is
that λt = 0 most of the time. But we see that actually λt swings between 0 and 1.
5.2 Coordination Failure and Economic Growth
Given diﬀerent ¯ θ levels, I am going to compare economic growth rates with and
without coordination failure, holding all the other factors the same. In this way, I
can explicitly show how coordination failure leads to slower economic growth.
First, given each level of ¯ θ, I will simulate the model with 500 periods and simulate
it 501 times. Then the average economic growth rate will be calculated. All the
parameters take the same values as in Section 5.1.
Next, given the parameter values unchanged, I assume that the Pareto optimal
24equilibrium with perfect information is realized in each period. I will simulate this
new model with 500 periods and simulate it 501 times. The average net economic
growth rates are calculated and compared with those in the case with coordination
failure.
Table 1 and Figure 11 give the results:
Table 1: Net economic growth rates with and without coordination
¯ θ 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8
g − 1 0.0200 0.0200 0.0200 0.0200 0.0200 0.0200 0.0201 0.0204 0.0233
gFB − 1 0.0262 0.0329 0.0450 0.0647 0.0959 0.1404 0.2010 0.2828 0.3822
g−1
gFB−1 0.7626 0.6084 0.4444 0.3089 0.2086 0.1425 0.0998 0.0722 0.0610
¯ θ 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6
g − 1 0.0440 0.1803 0.5840 0.9354 1.1874 1.4328 1.6889 1.9727
gFB − 1 0.5041 0.6472 0.8108 0.9960 1.2016 1.4360 1.6896 1.9729
g−1
gFB−1 0.0873 0.2786 0.7203 0.9391 0.9882 0.9978 0.9996 0.9999



























Figure 11: Growth rates with and without a coordinator when ¯ θ changes
25Both Table 1 and Figure 11 reveal that coordination failure can severely dampen
economic growth when ¯ θ is in the coordination failure zone. On the other hand,
coordination failure will not have signiﬁcant eﬀects on economic growth when the
returns of the new technology are either much lower or higher than those of the
conventional technology. We know that the lower
g−1
gFB−1 is, the more severe the
coordination failure is. When ¯ θ approaches the coordination zone from below,
g−1
gFB−1
goes lower and lower, which means that coordination failure is more and more severe.
In the extreme case when ¯ θ = 0.8, the economic growth rate with coordination failure
is only 6 percent of that in the Pareto optimal solution. Meanwhile, when ¯ θ goes
higher and leaves the coordination zone,
g−1
gFB−1 goes higher and higher, which means
that coordination failure is less and less severe.
5.3 Economic Growth and Volatility
First, I will use the same method as in Section 5.2 to ﬁnd the average growth rates
and variances given diﬀerent levels of ¯ θ. Then the relationship between economic
growth and variance will be checked.
























Figure 12: How economic growth changes in ¯ θ


















Figure 13: How economic volatility changes in ¯ θ


















Figure 14: Relationship between economic growth and volatility when ¯ θ changes
From the above ﬁgures we can see that in general, there is a positive relationship
between economic growth and volatility with an increase in ¯ θ. However, the positive
relationship becomes less salient when ¯ θ is in some area of the coordination failure
27zone. We can see that in this range, the economy grows without signiﬁcant increase
in volatility.
The intuition for the above results is as follows. When ¯ θ < log(r), λ is rela-
tively stable and equal to 1 most of the time, which means that all the economic
agents will choose to invest in the conventional technology most of the time. Since
the conventional technology has constant returns, both the uncertainty about the
economic fundamentals of the new technology and the uncertainty about the actions
of other agents vanish. Thus the economy is the most stable in this case. When
¯ θ ∈ [log(r),log(r) + 1], which is in the coordination zone, λ swings between 0 and 1.
Therefore, both kinds of uncertainties contribute to the overall economic volatility.
The reason for the less salient positive relationship between growth and volatility in
some area of this range is that the second kind of uncertainty about the actions of
other agents kicks in and prevents agents from investing in the new technology. Con-
sequently, even when θ increases, λ does not increase very signiﬁcantly, depressing the
increase in economic volatility. When ¯ θ > log(r) + 1, λ is relatively stable and equal
to zero most of time. In this case the main uncertainty comes from the economic
fundamentals of the new technology. The economy is most volatile in this case due to
two reasons. First, all the agents will invest in the new technology, which is riskier by
nature compared to the conventional technology, leading to the volatility. Second, the
returns of the new technology are assumed to be log-normally distributed. So their
variance will increase in the mean. This is because for a log-normally distributed
variable X = ex, where x is normally distributed with mean µ and variance σ2, the
variance of X is given by:





In general, economic growth and variance exhibit a positive correlation with the
increase in ¯ θ because of the shifting of investment to the new technology and and the
nature of the new technology modeled in this model.
Next, I will use the same method in Section 5.2 to ﬁnd the average growth rates
and variances given diﬀerent levels of x∗(ρ∗). Here ¯ θ = 1.0, which is in the coordi-
nation failure zone. Then the relationship between economic growth and volatility is
examined.





















Figure 15: How economic growth changes in x∗





















Figure 16: How economic volatility changes in x∗
The ﬁgures above reveal that a small decrease in x∗ will greatly increase economic
growth and generate a signiﬁcant positive correlation between economic growth and
variance. This is because a decrease in x∗ leads to both more investment in the




















Figure 17: Relationship between economic growth and volatility when x∗ changes
new technology and higher returns of the new technology, both of which contribute
to higher growth. Meanwhile, more investment in the new technology results in
higher economic volatility. We know that a risk neutral agent will deﬁnitely have
a lower x∗(ρ∗) than a risk averse agent. So the risk attitude of agents could be a
source of a positive correlation between economic growth and volatility associated
with coordination failure.
6 Policy Implications
This paper reveals that coordination failure can hamper a country’s new technology
investment and economic growth. Therefore, the government needs to play the role
of a coordinator to improve social welfare. In summary, there are several implications
that I have obtained from the model. First, when the returns of the new technology
are close to those of the conventional technology, coordination failure is signiﬁcant
and government intervention is most needed. Second, coordination failure is usually
manifested as under-investment in the new technology. Therefore, any government
policies stimulating more investment in the new technology will help alleviate coor-
30dination failure. Third, public information can play a role in alleviating coordination
failure.
Next I will discuss one speciﬁc government policy based on my model.
Based on the above example of β → ∞, a simple way to achieve the socially
optimal solution is to tax the agents investing in the conventional technology or to
subsidize those investing in the new technology. This is a natural result due to my
assumption of the increasing returns to scale in the new technology investment. In
fact, a lot of research emphasizing the public good property of new technology suggests
this policy.
Suppose that the government introduces a penalty τ to the investment in the





= log(r − τ).
Then we get x∗ = log(r − τ) + 1
2. Let τ = (1 − e− 1
2)r, then x∗ = log(r), which is
exactly the optimal cutoﬀ level. Suppose this lump-sum tax will be returned to the
agents, then the ﬁrst best solution is achieved. Note that here the government can
achieve the ﬁrst best outcome because this is a very special case with β → ∞. In
such a case, the ﬁrst kind of uncertainty about the economic fundamental of the new
technology vanishes. The ineﬃciency is purely caused by the coordination failure. So
the government can step in to play a role as a coordinator and correct the ineﬃciency.
Note that we have to treat this policy implication with caution. We must be aware
that it is derived from a model under some highly simpliﬁed assumptions about a real
economy. New technology is unknown by nature and involves a severe information
asymmetry problem, which increases the diﬃculty for governments to implement
targeted intervention in reality. However, the general message that this analysis
sends us is that the presence of externalities in new technology investment demands
government intervention to stimulate more new technology investment.
317 Conclusions
In this paper I argue that due to the special features of uncertainty and externalities
of new technology, coordination failure can occur in a country’s new technology in-
vestment and lead to slower capital accumulation and economic growth. Combining a
global game into a two-sector Overlapping Generation model, I demonstrate that co-
ordination failure can be manifested as under-investment in the new technology and it
is most severe when the returns from the new technology investment are close to those
from the conventional technology investment. My model also reveals that the tradeoﬀ
between economic growth and volatility can occur because more investment in the
new technology will alleviate coordination failure, but meanwhile will lead to higher
economic volatility. In addition, policy implications of my model are explored. I ﬁnd
that the government intervention in favor of new technology investment is needed to
alleviate coordination failure.
32APPENDIX
This appendix proves that there is a unique trigger strategy equilibrium in the model
by using the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies.
In a typical period t, the expected utility of an agent receiving a private signal ρ,
given that all the others follow the trigger strategy ˆ ρ, denoted by u(ρ, ˆ ρ), is given by
u(ρ, ˆ ρ) = E(θ − l|ρ) + log(µ) = ρ − Φ(
√
γ(ˆ ρ − ¯ r +
β
α
(ˆ ρ − ρ))) + log(µ).
Note that u(ρ, ˆ ρ) is increasing in ρ, and decreasing in ˆ ρ (The subscript t is omitted
here since the proof can be applied to any period).
When ρ is suﬃciently low, investing in the new technology will be the dominant
strategy for an agent, no matter what strategies other agents will take. Let us denote
it as ρ
0. All agents realize this and rule out any strategy for agents to invest in the
new technology below ρ
0. Then investing in the new technology cannot be optimal




0) = log(r) + log(µ).
This is because the trigger strategy around ρ
1 is the best response to the trigger
strategy around ρ
0, and all agents believe that other agents will invest in the conven-
tional technology when their private signals are below ρ
1. Since the agents’ expected
return is decreasing in the second argument, this rules out any strategy for agents
to invest in the new technology below ρ




1 < · · ·ρ
k < · · ·,
where any strategy of investing in the new technology when ρ < ρ
k does not survive
k rounds of deletion of strictly dominated strategies. The sequence is increasing
because u(·,·) is increasing in the ﬁrst argument and decreasing in the second one.
The smallest solution ρ to the equation u(ρ,ρ) = log(r) + log(µ) is the least upper
bound of this sequence. Any strategy of investing in the new technology below ρ
cannot survive iterated dominance.
33Similarly we can have an analogous argument beginning with the case that ρ
is large enough and the strategy to invest in the new technology is dominant no
matter what strategies other agents will take. If ρ is the largest solution to u(ρ,ρ) =
log(r)+log(µ), any strategy of investing in the conventional strategy when the signal
is higher than ρ cannot survive the deletion of strictly dominated strategies.
Given γ < 2π, there is only a unique solution to u(ρ,ρ) = log(r) + log(µ). So
the smallest solution is equal to the largest solution. There is only one strategy
surviving the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies, which is the unique
equilibrium strategy in this game.
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